In partial fulfillments of the requirements of EL 635 Information Operations
Preface
This essay is intended to give readers a better understanding of how information applies to all levels of war--tactical, operational and strategic. Most discussions of information operations address information use only at the tactical and strategic levels of war, neglecting the operational level. With this essay, I attempt to fill that void. Notable is my classification of intelligence gathering as a largely operational level endeavor.
This essay was written within the construct of U.S. information warfare experiences in Iraq, ranging from Operation Desert Storm up to and including Operation Iraqi Freedom. Aside from providing a worthy basis for analysis, this also helped to narrow the scope. A specific goal of this essay was to capture the unique and unprecedented media coverage surrounding Operation Iraqi Freedom, which is still ongoing at the time of this writing.
I would like to thank Major Paul Guevin for providing a tremendous stream of resources on the topic of information operations. I would also like to thank Lt Col Joe Reynolds for his assistance and research materials.
iii Abstract According to U.S. Joint Military Doctrine, the central hypothesis of IO is exploiting the enemy's information and information systems, while protecting one's own. (JP 3-13) IO is a concept as old as warfare itself, but has attracted more attention in recent years due to leaps in information technology. Global Positioning System, data links, computer networks, and even the media represent just a few facets of this glittering gem. IO is ubiquitous and applies across all phases and ranges of military operations, and pervades all levels of war…tactical, operational and strategic, making it a nation's single most powerful weapon. Although used extensively throughout the history of warfare, nowhere else has IO served a more extensive role than in than in U.S. military actions in Iraq.
iv
Information Pervades All Levels of War: A Study of Information Operations in Iraq
Modern wars are won by dominating the information realm. "Today the ability to collect, communicate, process, and protect information is the most important factor defining military power. In the past armor, firepower, and mobility defined military power, but now it often matters less how fast you can move or how much destructive force you can apply. Stealth trumps armor, precision trumps explosive force, and being able to react faster than your opponent trumps speed. If this is true, then to defeat your opponent, you must first win the information war." (Berkowitz, 21) 
Understanding the Information Domain
In order to grasp the significance of information as a weapon of war, one must first understand the information domain. Information consists of facts, data and the meanings assigned to them. The information domain includes information itself and a large group of info system components. Thomas Rona, former Boeing engineer and info warfare guru, broadly defined information system components as hardware, software, system operators, system users, and data. Given the supposition that wars are fought and won in the information domain, the best way to defeat an enemy is to attack the components of its information systems. The best component to attack depends on the opportunities at hand and the risks one is willing to take. (Berkowitz, 30) After determining which system component to attack, the information warrior must answer the confounding question of whether to deny, deceive, destroy or exploit enemy information. The correct answer is "it depends." One may want to deny or destroy encrypted avenues of communication to force the enemy into using open lines that can be exploited. When ones own information system is being exploited, inserting false data into that system to deceive the enemy may be the best choice. Another consideration is preserving an enemy's information system for later use, such as when re-establishing the peace. 
Tactical, Operational and Strategic Levels of Information War
Tactical, operational and strategic levels of war apply uniquely in the information realm.
Joint Publication 1-02 defines the tactical level of war as that which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives. (JP 1-02) It is focused on the order and maneuver of combat elements against the enemy. Tactical use of information refers to information that influences or enables those battles and engagements; for example, GPS data permits a precision weapon to hit its target.
The operational level of war encompasses a broader dimension of time and space than do tactics, including logistical and administrative support for tactical forces and the sequencing and exploitation of tactical successes to achieve strategic goals. ( 
Information as a Tactical Weapon.
Information has been used in Iraq at the tactical level of warfare in countless ways.
Stealth technology denied the Iraqi air defenses critical information--namely the ability to "see"
USAF F-117s and B-2s with radar. 
Information as an Operational Weapon
Most discussions of information warfare focus either on the tactical or strategic level of war, but it also plays a role at the operational level. For instance, intelligence gathering, which is normally considered to reside at the strategic level of war, fulfills many operational level functions such as determining force movements and sequencing of operations. This is a big part of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), which falls squarely at the operational level.
IPB was particularly good in Iraq because U.S. forces had a long time to collect intelligence in the months preceding Desert Storm. Since then, the U.S. has persistently collected intelligence information in all its forms in Iraq, especially in reinforcing the no-fly zones and monitoring for evidence of weapons of mass destruction. It has also gone to great lengths to protect its information through Operational Security (OPSEC).
OPSEC is simply the degree to which the truth is concealed or revealed. A useful analogy is the opening or closing of a window blind. The famous "Left Hook" provides an excellent example of offensive and defensive OPSEC. In Desert Storm, Coalition forces prepared a marine amphibious assault from the Persian Gulf. This preparation was real, and all the U.S. marines fully expected to attack according to plan. The "blinds" were slightly opened to allow the enemy to see this preparation and draw their own conclusions (offensive OPSEC disinformation is used to evoke a TV appearance by an enemy leader, which may enhance the ability to track them electronically. However, this can be a risky proposition because it offers the enemy an opportunity to use that TV appearance to achieve strategic effects.
Information as a Strategic Weapon.
Information is used as a strategic weapon primarily through the media. This perception stands as a major obstacle for American as it struggles to maintain a slim advantage on the information front.
If the U.S. is seeking to maintain their edge in warfare they will have to aggressively pursue dominance of the information domain. Use of information at all levels of war is key to that dominance, but classifying it as tactical, operational, or strategic can be tricky. Modern information technologies, networks, and on the spot media reporting have caused a growing interrelationship between the three levels of war. The compression of time and space that characterizes modern war can blur those relationships even more. IO further obscures the lines of demarcation because strategic effects can often be achieved using tactical means. In the future, actions can be classified as strategic, operational or tactical based on their intended effect or ultimate contribution, but many times the accuracy of these labels can only be determined in retrospect. (JP-3, II-2) Only through careful analysis of the past can American leaders begin to predict how information will be used tactically, operationally, or strategically in the future. Dominance in the information realm will determine who wins future wars. This includes dominance on all fronts and at all levels of warfare. The lines separating the tactical, operational or strategic will likely become more obscure. As bandwidth disappears as a limiting factor, information available to the individual soldier at the lowest level will become more complete.
The future of Information Operations
This will empower them to act on a tactical level, but create strategic effects. Information systems will range from the most technically advanced to the simplest, and will be employed together to defeat the adversary, which may consist only of a network of non-state actors waging Cyberwar.
Cyberwar is a prominent theory among future warfare prognosticators, and its effects range from the tactical to the strategic. Cyberwar is what we traditionally recognize as IO and shares the same basic definition. "At a minimum it represents an extension of the traditional importance of obtaining information in war-of having superior [C4ISR technologies and smart weapons] and of trying to locate, read, surprise, and deceive the enemy before he does the same to you." But it also has broad ramifications for military organization and doctrine. (Arquilla, 31) Notable is the requirement for decentralized execution in a highly networked military.
This idea runs contrary to the earlier view that better technology will lead to centralized execution. With unlimited bandwidth, warriors at the lowest level will gain access to vast amounts of synthesized information. Assuming they are given mission type orders and clear commander's intent, they will be in a unique position to take the best course of action in each situation. Commanders at the highest level will be unable to micro manage lower level decisions. Instead they will require "Topsight…a central understanding of the big picture which enhances the management of complexity," (Arquilla, 31) These tactical, operational and strategic concepts are consistent with future force initiatives. The U.S. Army is developing the Objective Force, which consists of small, lethal units operating independently, but highly networked to provide a common operational picture and superior battlefield awareness. In the same way that precision airpower redefined "mass" from the air, the Objective Force may redefine mass on the ground. There will no longer be a need for huge fielded forces to defeat the enemy. Indeed, the dispersed nature of future enemies will call for dispersed forces to defeat them. Finally, future command and control will resemble an internet-like system that securely and redundantly links the observing, deciding and acting elements of the decision cycle. This type of integration between air, sea and ground platforms will permit a common operating picture of the entire theater.
A super-network such as "Battlespace Wide Web" could synthesize all the available information of every participating system to allow platforms to "push" and "pull" data on demand. (Colella) Airpower platforms such as Multi-sensor Command and Control Constellation and Aircraft (MC2C and MC2A) and Roll-on-roll-off Beyond line of Sight Enhanced (ROBE) are key enablers of this vision. (Behler) The resulting detailed battlespace picture would improve combat survivability, efficiency, and situational awareness at the tactical level of war. Greater access for senior commanders to monitor the battle, either airborne or from a remote location, would enhance "Topsight" and consequently improve performance at the operational and strategic levels. The upshot is full spectrum information dominance.
Conclusion
Today the capacity to collect, analyze, disseminate and safeguard information is the most important characteristic defining military and national power. For the United States, nowhere was that capacity demonstrated more clearly than in the battles waged in Iraq over the last decade. From Desert Storm, the world's threshold event for modern information warfare, to Iraqi Freedom, the ultimate example of media warfare, Iraq represents the full spectrum of information operations.
Information Operations has been used throughout the entire history of warfare, but recent leaps in information technology have spurred renewed interest in this ubiquitous medium.
Communications, stealth, GPS, computer networks and instantaneous media reporting represent a just a few of its elements. IO touches everyone and everything, from the rifleman in the desert,
